总之，在较长的时期内，我国的商业银行无论是本身的治理结构、能力与经验，还是作为债权人时的权益维护环境，都很难使之胜任控制股东兼主要融资人的角色。推行以银行为主导的债权融资体系下的公司治理模式，的确不是一个更有效率和可行的抉择。

Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 1155 (1985).
对两种模式区别的研究，可见M.J. Roe, “Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States”, Yale Law Journal 102:1927-2003 (1993).
2007年，中国证券市场融资额达到7728亿元，为历年最高。但即便如此，整个直接融资额（包括企业债券）占融资债券额的总比重也不过是17.5%。见中国人民银行：《2007年中国金融市场报告》（2008年4月10日发布）总论部分第4页，中国人民银行网站http://www.pbc.gov.cn/detail.asp?col=540&ID=335。
如吴敬琏等：《国有经济的战略性改组》，中国发展出版社1998年版，转引自张文魁：《中国国有企业产权改革与公司治理转型》，中国发展出版社2007年版，第34-35页。李雨龙、朱晓磊：《公司治理法律实务》，法律出版社2006年版，第220-227页。
Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 1.
Yoshiro Miwa and J. Mark Ramseyer, Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Lessons from the Prewar Japanese Cotton Textile Industry, in Fox and Heller eds, Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms231, Princeton University Press 2006, p 235. 该文较早的版本载于29 J. Legal Stud. 171.
Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim, Overview, in Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Insider Control and the Role of Banks, at xi, xiii (Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim eds. 1995).
Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911 (1996).1915.
前引Yoshiro Miwa and J. Mark Ramseyer, Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Lessons from the Prewar Japanese Cotton Textile Industry, p 234.
如Roman Frydman et al., Needed Mechanisms of Corporate Governance and Finance in Eastern Europe, 1 Econ. Transition 171, (1993)明确指出，“考虑到东欧目前的状况，银行和其他金融中介带来的外部控制机制适宜提高企业业绩”，“而其他机制如股票市场或外国投资在近期内都不会足够强劲。即使起作用，也不会是外部治理的主要源泉”。
转引自Katharina Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder And Creditor Rights In Transition Economies, in 前引Fox and Heller eds, Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms, p 58.
Erik Bergloef, Corporate Governance in Transition Economies: The Theory and Its Policy Implications, in Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Insider Control and the Role of Banks 59, p. 82 (Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim eds. 1995).
如Roman Frydman, & Andrzej Rapaczynski, Privatization in Eastern Europe: Is the State Withering Away? 37-38 (1994)明确指出，东欧就是需要德日那种制度“来监督重组的努力”。
Jeremy Edwards & Klaus Fisher, Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany, (1994) Ch. 2.
Stein,  “Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia,” 96 J. Pol. Econ. 61, 64-78 (1988)
Porter, “Capital Disadvantages: America''s Failing Capital Investment System,” Harv. Bus. Rev. (1992).
参见Theodor Baums, “Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Bank”, 40 Am. J. Comp. Law 503, 508  (1992). Helmut M. Dietl,  Capital Markets and Corporate Governance in Japan, Germany, and the United States 122-26 (1998).
参见Klaus Hopt：《欧洲公司治理的共同准则？》，王锐译，《比较》第5辑，中信出版社2003年版，第139页。
对主银行制的分析，可见Miwa and Ramseyer, The Fable Of The Keiretsu: Urban Legends Of Modern Japan, University of Chicago Press 2005. Miwa and Ramseyer, Dose the Relationship banking matter? The myth of the Japanese Main bank,  2 J Empirical Legal Stud.  261(2005).
Masahiko Aoki,  Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. Econ. Lit. 1 (1990). Masahiko Aoki, Information, Corporate Governance, and Institutional Diversity: Competitiveness in Japan, the United States, and the Transitional Economies (Stacey Jehlik trans., 2000). Aoki,  Toward a comparative institutional analysis, Cambridge, MIT Press 2001
Masahiko Aoki,  Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. Econ. Lit. 1 (1990).; Aoki, “The Japanese Firm as a System of Attributes: A Survey and Research Agenda,” in The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive Strength 11 (Masahiko Aoki & Ronald Dore, eds. 1994). Aoki, “Monitoring Characteristics of the Main Bank System: An Analytical and Developmental View,” in The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and Transforming Economies (Masahiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick, eds. 1994).
John M. Litwack, Corporate Governance, Banks, and Fiscal Reform in Russia, in Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Insider Control and the Role of Banks 99, 100 (Masahiko Aoki & Hyung-Ki Kim eds. 1995)
Pranab Bardhan & John E. Roemer, Market Socialism: A Case for Rejuvenation, 6 J. Econ. Persp. 101, 103 (1992). 不过，也有日本学者认为，日本19世纪中期已经具备了许多近代化的重要条件，如私人商业和手工业制造部门的强大实力、可靠的交通和通讯系统、受过良好教育的人民、相对友善的政府经济政策、加强民族统一的愿望。“这是今天许多发展中国依然很难保证的”。见大野建一：《从江户到平成：解密日本经济发展之路》，中信出版社2006年版，第二章。大野建一：“日本发展之旅的经验”，《比较》第24辑，中信出版社2006年版。
Mashiko Aoki & Hugh Patrick, (eds.), The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and Transforming Economies (1994).
参见缪因知：《中国证券市场建设之若干法律路径的效用分析》，《经济法学家（2007年卷）》，北京大学出版社2008年版。这里比较类似John Coffee所谓的实质趋同理论。
Mark J. Roe, “Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control: The Incompatibility of the American Public Firm with Social Democracy” (Columbia Law Sch., Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 155, 1999), http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf/abstract id=165143.
Joseph Grundfest,  Subordination of American capital, 27 Journal of Financial Economics 89(1990).
Henry Hansmann, Ownership Of Enterprise，Harvard University Press, 1996, p.59.该书中文版见汉斯曼：《企业所有权论》，于静译，中国政法大学出版社2001年。
Steven Kaplan, Top Executive, turnover and firm performance in Germany,  10 Journal of Law, Economics and organization 142 (1994). Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance Convergence of Form or Function, in Gordon and Roe（eds.）,Convergence and Persistence in Corporate governance, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp.137-138.中译文见《公司治理：趋同与存续》，赵玲、刘凯译，北京大学出版社2006年。
Bernard Black, “The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets”, 48 UCLA Law. Review 781,  785 (2001). 中译文可见《强大证券市场的法律和制度前提》，洪艳蓉译，北大金融法中心编：《金融法苑》第57期，法律出版社2004年版。
Ronald Gilson, “The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European Corporate Governance Environment,” 61 Fordham L. Rev. 161 (1992); R Gilson, “Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When do Institutions Matter?,” 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 327 (1996).
Simon Johnson, Peter Boone, Alasdair Breach & Eric Friedman, “Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis”, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 141 (2000) .
参见前引Bernard Black, “The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets”, 833.
Bernard Black,  “The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets”, 48 UCLA Law Review 781(2001), 832.
Gilson、Milhaupt：《监管改革的选择：以日本公司治理为例》，李正全译，《比较》第16辑，中信出版社2005年版， 第164页。
Kang & Stulz, “Do Banking Stocks Affect Borrowing Firm’s Performance : A Analysis of the Japanese Experience”(1998), 转引自张文魁：《中国国有企业产权改革与公司治理转型》，中国发展出版社2007年版，第34页。
Weinstein & Yafeh, “On the Costs of a Bank- centered Financial System: Evidence from the Main Bank Relations in Japan”, 53 Journal of Finance 635, (1998),
Aoki, Gregory Jackson and Miyajima, eds, Corporate Governance in Japan: Organizational diversity and institutional change, Oxford university press, 2007, ch 2.
Id, ch 3.
参见Curits Milhaupt: “A Lost Decade for Corporate Law Reform in Japan:  What’s Changed, What Hasn’t and Why”, Columbia Law School Working Paper 2003, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=830005.
参见前引Ronald Gilson、Curits Milhaupt：《监管改革的选择：以日本公司治理为例》。
Aoki, Jackson and Miyajima, eds, Corporate Governance in Japan: Organizational diversity and institutional change, ch 12.
Id, ch 4.
Id, ch 10.
Id, ch 9.
不过，操控公司控制权市场的还是银行及其关联股权基金，他们不断地阻止敌意接管和清算。青木昌彦、Gregory Jackson：“认识公司治理和组织架构的多样性”，《比较》第31辑，李超译，吴素萍校，中信出版社2007年版，146页。
同前注，第163—164页，第174页。
同前注，第158页。
当然，也仍然有不少学者坚持认为德国的公司治理模式实现了资本和劳动力的有效合作，见David Charny: “Special Symposium Issue: The German Corporate Governance System”,1998 Columbia Business Law Review 145(1998).
相关描述可见Jeffrey N. Gordon, International Relations wedge in the corporate convergence debate, in Gordon and Roe（eds.）,Convergence and Persistence in Corporate governance, Cambridge University Press, 2004. 中文版见《公司治理：趋同与存续》，赵玲、刘凯译，北京大学出版社2006年。
Dariusz Wójcik, “Change in the German Model of Corporate Governance: Evidence from Blockholdings, 1997–2001,” Environment and Planning A 35 (2003).
对该指令的介绍可见汤欣、朱芸阳：《欧盟新公司法指令规范下的反收购措施》，《清华法律评论》第一卷第一辑，清华大学出版社2006年版。
Klaus Hopt：《欧洲公司治理的共同准则？》，《比较》第5辑，中信出版社2003年版，第140-141页。
参见William L. Horton, Jr., “The Perils of Universal Banking in Central and Eastern Europe”, 35 Va. J. Int’l Law. 683, 692 (1995)
Id，p696.
Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman, and Anna Tarassova, ”Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?”, 52 Stan. Law Review 1731,1791 (2000).
EBRD (1998),  Transition Report, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London.
Pistor, Patterns of Legal Change: Shareholder and Creditor Rights In Transition Economies, in Fox and Heller eds, Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms, p 58.
详见Miwa and Ramseyer, Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies: Lessons from the Prewar Japanese Cotton Textile Industry, in Fox and Heller eds, Corporate Governance Lessons from Transition Economy Reforms.
Guo Li,” Financial Conglomerates in China: Legality, Model and Concerns”, Peking University Journal of Legal Studies (2008).
即使是积极筹备海外上市中的国有银行，也仍然爆发了多起经营丑闻，如2005年建设银行董事长张恩照受贿案、中国银行黑龙江分行2005年松街支行、2006年双鸭山支行的数亿元票据诈骗大案。
Bernard Black, “The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets”,48 UCLA Law Review 781, 832 (2001).
例如根据2001年《国务院办公厅转发人民银行关于企业逃废金融债务有关情况报告的通知》，截至2000年末，在五大行开户的改制企业逃废银行贷款本息约占银行贷款本息的32%，占企业总数的51%。
参见唐向文：《国有企业破产问题与银行对策》，《农村金融研究》1996年第5期，第47-50页。
参见中国人民银行金融研究所：《国有企业债务重组中如何保护银行资产》，载《国有企业债务重组与银行资产保全》，经济科学出版社1998年版，第20页。